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Abstract
Women are under-represented in politics. In this paper, we test one of the potential ex-
planations for this situation: gender-bias from voters. We use a natural experiment during
French local elections in 2015: for the first time in this country, candidates had to run by
pairs, which had to be gender-balanced. We argue that this reform confused some voters,
who might have assumed that the first name on the ballot represented the "main" candidate.
Since the order of the candidates on the ballot was determined by alphabetical order, the
order of appearance of male and female candidates is as-good-as-random, and this setting
allows us to isolate gender biases from selection effects. Our main result is that there exists
a negative gender bias affecting right-wing candidates, who receive about 1.5 points lower
shares of vote when the female candidate appears first on the ballot. The missing votes pre-
vented some pairs of candidates from being elected. Using the fact that the candidates can
(but do not have to) report additional information about themselves on the ballot, we show
that this discrimination is likely to be statistical, since the most affected women are those
running in pairs which do not report any information.
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1 Introduction
Are women discriminated against in politics ? While decades of research have investigated
the reasons behind the under-representation of women in politics, uncovering discriminatory
behaviors of voters proved being a difficult task, because of the numerous selection effects which
affect the observed and unobserved characteristics of women present in the political arena.
In this paper, we provide causal evidence of discrimination against women in politics. To do
so, we use a unique feature of the French Départementales 1 elections of 2015, which allows us to
unambiguously disentangle selection effects from preferences over female candidates in a real-
world setting. For the first time in the history of French elections, candidates ran by pairs, which
necessarily had to be gender-balanced. Therefore, each pair of candidates included a man and
a woman (each with a substitute of the same gender). Upon casting their ballot, voters could
only opt for one of the different pairs of candidates, so that for every pair, each male and female
candidate received exactly the same number of votes. If a pair was elected, both candidates
were appointed to the same seat in the Conseil Départemental (the Département assembly where
the elected candidates are seating), so that their fates were completely tied.
Crucially, within each pair, the order of appearance of the candidates on the ballot was deter-
mined by alphabetical order: this order determined only the place of the candidate’s name on
the ballot. As we argue, such a setting yields an as-good-as-random allocation of the order of
gender on the ballot, and allows us to explore whether pairs where the woman appears first on
the ballot have different electoral outcomes than pairs where the man appears first.
The rationale behind this test is that, although the order of appearance of the candidates on the
ballot does not have any impact on the subsequent prerogatives attributed to the candidates,
some voters may mistakenly have thought that the first candidate would be the "main" candi-
date. Indeed, since voters were typically used to voting for a single candidate and a substitute,
the new rules are unlikely to have been fully understood by everyone. As the French statistical
institute IFOP acknowledged some weeks before the election: "These elections were character-
ized by insufficient information", and "the introduction of pairs of candidates unsettled long-
established landmarks" in the mind of voters (IFOP (2015)). Therefore, any observed difference
1The Département is a French territorial unit gathering numerous competences in terms of schooling, public infras-
tructures, culture, sports.
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between pairs with a male or female candidate listed on the first position would mean that we
observe two phenomena. First, limited attention from some voters, as defined by DellaVigna
(2009). Indeed, because the fates of both candidates on a ballot are tied, if all voters knew per-
fectly the rules of the elections, we would not find any treatment effect. Secondly, a pure gender
bias from these voters.
The identification of this bias comes from several particularly interesting features of our setting.
First, the number of male and female candidates are exactly identical - in order to enforce strict
parity in local councils. Secondly, while the characteristics of male and female candidates are
on average different, candidates characteristics do not predict whether the male or the female
candidate appears first on the ballot. The effect we measure is therefore unlikely to be affected
by selection biases, since it consists in comparing whether identical pairs on average perform
differently when the male or the female candidate is first on the ballot. Furthermore, our identi-
fication strategy is strengthened by the fact that parties did not seem to strategically match male
and female candidates based on their surname in order, for example, to place the male candidate
at the top of the ballot: indeed, the distribution of the first letter of male and female surnames
are identical.
Comparing treated and untreated pairs of candidates of identical political affiliations across
precincts, we show that right-wing pairs where the female candidate appeared first lost about
1.5 percentage points in shares of vote during the first round, while on average this was not
the case of pairs from other parties. These effects substantially affected the outcome of the elec-
tion: indeed, the affected pairs were 4 points less likely to go to the second round or to win the
election.
This setting not only allows to identify pure discrimination, but also to characterize the type of
discrimination at stake. Discrimination is often viewed as being either taste-based or statistical.
In the first case, voters dislike voting for female candidates whatever their characteristics or the
information they have about them. In the second case, voters apply stereotypes on women can-
didates because of a lack of information about the characteristics of the candidates. We argue
that, in our setting, our treatment effect reflects statistical rather than taste-based discrimination
against female candidates. To identify it, we follow a methodology similar to the one developed
by Altonji and Pierret (2001) and exploit a unique feature of the French electoral law, which
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states that the candidates can report additional information about themselves on the ballot -
such as their political experience, age, occupation, or picture. Comparing treatment effects be-
tween ballots with reported information and ballots without any information, we show that,
for the right-wing pairs, discrimination disappears when information about the candidates is
displayed.
We show that these missing votes do not reflect differential abstention, and did not translate
into blank and null votes; instead they translated into higher shares of votes for the competing
candidates. However, the competing pairs with a female candidate listed first did not receive
more votes than others. Such a result stacks the desk against our interpretation of the results
as reflecting statistical rather than taste-based discrimination. Indeed, if our result was driven
by taste-based discrimination, we should have observed that pairs of candidates with a male
candidate listed first benefited more from the discrimination against right-wing women.
Finally, we explore two different types of heterogeneity. First, we show that discrimination
does not depend directly on the incumbency status of the candidates. Assuming that these
characteristics are a proxy for candidates’ quality, this alleviates the concern that the results are
directly driven by differences of quality between male and female candidates. Secondly, we test
whether discrimination depends on the characteristics of the precincts. We show that, while
electoral discrimination does not vary with the age, unemployment rate and level of education
of the population, it is greater in areas with high gender discrimination on the labor market, as
measured by the unexplained component of a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of wage gaps at
the local level.
These results bear important implications for the public debate around electoral discrimination.
First of all, while our results show discrimination against right-wing female candidates, it does
not imply that right-wing voters are more prejudiced against women than voters from other
parties. Indeed, the presence of limited attention is necessary for the identification of discrimi-
nation. Not observing discrimination against the female candidates of other parties can simply
indicate that they are less subject to the limited attention bias. Secondly, since the amount of
information available about the candidates on the ballot seems to play an important role on the
outcome of the election, it calls for a more general reflexion about a potential standardization
of the ballots’ layout. Finally, since electoral discrimination seems to be higher in places with a
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greater gender discrimination on the labor market, policies aiming at reducing gender biases in
politics are likely to be more effective if coordinated with policies on other markets.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we contribute to the debate about the rea-
sons why women are underrepresented in politics. Many studies analyzed the selection pro-
cesses faced by women upon entering in politics. Women might select themselves less into
politics because of a lack of self-confidence (Hayes and Lawless (2016)) or differential returns
from politics (Júlio and Tavares (2017)). More generally, women face tradeoffs between fam-
ily balance and competitive professional environments (Bertrand et al. (2010)). Conditional on
entering politics, parties might also fail at promoting women to high positions and at field-
ing them in winnable races (Sanbonmatsu (2010), Thomas and Bodet (2013), Esteve-Volart and
Bagues (2012), Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015)), even though their entrance in politics often causes
an increase in the quality of elected officials (Baltrunaite et al. (2014), Besley et al. (2017b)). Yet,
evidence on the last hurdle potentially faced by women in politics (namely, discrimination from
voters) are mixed, and if anything, tend to argue that discrimination against women does not
exist2.
Secondly, our study is among a small group of studies causally identifying statistical discrimina-
tion in politics in a real-world setting. Understanding the determinants of gender discrimination
is of particular importance since women in office are likely to behave differently than men in of-
fice (Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Ferreira and Gyourko (2014), Brollo and Troiano (2016)).
The debate over whether discrimination involves discriminatory tastes (Becker (1957)) or im-
perfect information (Phelps (1972), Arrow et al. (1973)) is a long-standing one. Current evidence
on gender-discrimination in politics vastly points towards the existence of statistical discrimi-
nation. Numerous survey studies show that different types of individuals have different pref-
erences over female politicians: McDermott (1998) and Burrell (1995) find that women are more
likely to prefer female candidates, while Dolan (1998) finds that minorities and elderly are more
likely to vote for women. McDermott (1997) argues that liberal voters are more likely to prefer
2Analyses of aggregate votes generally found that male and female candidates have equal success rates in elec-
tions, thus arguing that voters do not have gender biases (Darcy and Schramm (1977), Seltzer et al. (1997), McElroy
and Marsh (2009)). Some studies even argue that women might have an electoral advantage compared to men (Black
and Erickson (2003), Borisyuk et al. (2007)), and that after their first election, they are at least as likely to be reelected
as men (Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa (2014)). Milyo and Schosberg (2000) even argue that the barriers to entry
faced by women makes female incumbents of higher quality than male incumbents, resulting in an advantage for
female incumbents. On the other hand, several studies argue that voter biases are marginal compared to partisan
preferences (Dolan (2004), Dolan (2014), Hayes and Lawless (2016)).
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female candidates. Such preferences are likely to be driven by gender stereotypes (Koch (2002)).
In particular, in a context of low information, the gender of the candidate can be interpreted by
the voters as signals about the ideology of the candidates: McDermott (1998) shows that female
candidates are typically perceived as more liberal and more dedicated to honest government.
Evidence from lab experiments also tend to point the existence of different mechanisms leading
to statistical discrimination. Leeper (1991) shows that even when women candidates emit "mas-
culine" message, voters attribute them "feminine" characteristics. Huddy and Terkildsen (1993)
show that gender-based expectations over policies were more related to gender-traits stereo-
types than to gender-beliefs stereotypes. King and Matland (2003) show that biases against
women are likely to depend on partisan preferences, while Mo (2015) shows that both explicit
and implicit attitudes against women shape the probability of voting for female candidates.
However, very few studies managed to propose causal identifications of discrimination in pol-
itics using natural experiments. Most of the studies on gender in politics rely primarily on
aggregate data, surveys or laboratory experiments, which are problematic for several reasons.
Raw comparisons of aggregate data are unlikely to fully control for the selection process lead-
ing to the observed political competition. This is especially true if male and female candidates
are likely to differ in unobserved characteristics which might drive both their probabilities of
running as a candidate and of winning the election. Respondents’ answers in surveys might be
affected by characteristics of the interviewer, such as her gender (Huddy et al. (1997), Flores-
Macias and Lawson (2008), Pino (2017), Benstead (2013)), religion (Blaydes and Gillum (2013))
or language (Lee and Pérez (2014)). Finally, while laboratory experiments allow to disentangle
more accurately the mechanisms leading to potential gender-biases, they are hardly likely to
represent real-world election settings.
By overcoming these issues, natural experiments are particularly appealing. Discrimination on
the labor market has been plausibly identified through a vast range of field and natural exper-
iments, involving audit and correspondence studies, and the precise mechanisms behind ob-
served discrimination have been extensively discussed (see, among others, Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan (2004), Bertrand et al. (2005), Charles and Guryan (2008) , and Bertrand and Duflo
(2017) for a survey). Recent developments of big data also have allowed to plausibly identify
statistical discrimination on the housing market (Laouénan and Rathelot (2017)). However, field
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experiments are hardly applicable in the political arena - in particular since the secrecy of the
vote prevents from fully understanding voters’ motives - and natural experiments remain rare.
However, recent studies managed to exploit natural experiments and to causally identified dis-
crimination from voters - mostly in a statistical way. Bhavnani (2009), Beaman et al. (2009) and
De Paola et al. (2010) suggest that reserved seats for women in office is an efficient way of reduc-
ing gender stereotypes and statistical discrimination. Relatedly Pino (2017) shows that women
living in environments emphasizing traditional gender roles are less likely to vote for women3.
Finally, our analysis provides evidence of limited attention from voters. Since the seminal work
of Simon (1955), various pieces of research - coming especially from laboratory experiments -
suggested that attention is a scarce resource and that individuals make decisions using only
part of the available information (see DellaVigna (2009) for a survey). Voters might themselves
be myopic, punishing or rewarding incumbents for what happens shortly before the election
(Achen and Bartels (2004)), and replacing information about a whole electoral term (which might
be more difficult to access) by easy-to-grasp information about the last year in office (Healy and
Lenz (2014)). However, to the best of our knowledge, few studies provided evidence as regard
to whether individuals actually know the rules of the election when they cast their ballot. By
focusing on a type of discrimination which is possible only because of limited attention of the
voters, we therefore show that a non-negligible part of them were subject to limited attention
concerning the rules of the election 4. We therefore also contribute to a recent stream of research
showing how ballot layout can influence voters’ decision. Recent evidence showed that minor
candidates are likely to perform better when their name is located close to the name of a major
candidate (Shue and Luttmer (2009)), or when it is listed at the top of the ballot (Ho and Imai
(2006), Ho and Imai (2008) among others). Relatedly, the number of decisions to make on a ballot
can induce "choice fatigue", which substantially affects abstention (Augenblick and Nicholson
(2015)). Because our identification relies upon ballot order effects, it therefore reasserts that
limited attention concerning the rules of an election can play a key role on aggregate outcomes.
3To the best of our knowledge, only one study identified taste-based discrimination in an electoral setting (Broock-
man and Soltas (2017), on racial discrimination in Republican primary elections in the United States. Another field
where gender-biases have been explored through the lens of natural experiments is the field of academic recruitment
- see Bagues et al. (2016) for example.
4Whether this limited attention is due to differential costs of acquiring electoral information regarding the electoral
rules is left for further research.
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From this standpoint, this paper is to the best of our knowledge among the first to highlight the
link between limited attention and discrimination in politics5.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting
and the data we use. We provide descriptive statistics and various balance-checks showing
that selection into the treatment is unlikely. Section 3 describes our estimation strategy. Section
4 gathers our main empirical results. Section 5 studies potential channels for our results and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Framework and Data
2.1 Institutional Framework
This study relies on data from the 2015 French departmental elections, which took place on
March 22nd and March 29th. Departmental councellors were elected in 2,054 cantons (subdivi-
sions of the départements). In each of these precincts, lists ran by pairs which necessarily had to
be gender-balanced. Each candidate of a pair had to have a substitute of the same sex as her.
Overall, 9,097 pairs of candidates ran for office.
Within each list, the order of the candidates on the ballot was determined by alphabetical or-
der. Such a requirement is imposed by the article L.191 of the French electoral legislation. The
rules for printing electoral ballots are also stringent: it must be printed in only one color on a
blank sheet of format 105x148 mm, weigh between 60 and 80 grams per square meter and be in
landscape format. For each candidate, the name of its substitute must be written right after its
name, using a smaller font. According to the articles L.66, L.191, R.66-2, R.110 and R.111 of the
electoral code, any ballot not respecting these requirement is considered as null. Figure 1 shows
examples of compliant ballots, as communicated by the Ministry of Interior. The ballots on the
day of the election are the only ones to be subject to these requirements, which do not affect
campaign advertisement leaflets or electoral posters.
5A recent contribution from Bartoš et al. (2016) shows that in contexts of complete information, discrimination
can occur if processing all the available information is costly. In such a case, agents might focus only on a subset of
information, thus triggering statistical discrimination. As we argue later, such a setting is unlikely to apply to our
context, since the amount of information to process by default in our setting is minimal.
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Figure 1: Examples of valid ballots
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
For this analysis, we retrieved information about all the pairs of candidates from the Ministry of
Interior. Our database includes information on age, gender, incumbency status, political affilia-
tion and socioprofessional categories of each of these candidates. We matched these information
with the Répertoire National des Elus, to know whether the candidates also had other political
experience at the municipal, regional or parliamentary level. Finally, we also matched these
information with sociodemographic information at the precinct-level, retrieved from the 2013
Census.
In order to carry on our analysis, we classified candidates into different partisan groups. We
classified as extreme-left the lists labeled as Communists, Extreme-Left, Front de Gauche and Parti de
Gauche. We classified as left-wing the lists labeled as Parti Socialiste, Union de la Gauche, Radicaux
de Gauche and Divers Gauche. We classified as right-wing the lists labeled as MoDem, Union du
Centre, Union des Démocrates et des Indépendants, Debout La France, Divers-Droite, Union des Droites,
UMP. Finally we classified as extreme-right the lists labeled as Front National and Extreme Droite6.
We first begin by documenting the differences between candidates of different partisan groups
in Table 1. Overall, 28% of candidates were left-wing, a number which is comparable to the
share of right-wing candidates. 14% of candidates were classified as extreme-left, while 22%
were classified as extreme-right. Concerning political experience we categorized a candidate
as having previous political experience if she was, at the time of election, either an incumbent,
a municipal councellor in a municipality belonging to the precinct, a regional councellor, or a
member of parliament.
6By an abuse of language, we hereafter call "parties" the broad categorizations of extreme-left, left-wing, right-wing
and extreme-right candidates, described above.
9
Table 1: Characteristics of male and female candidates by partisan affiliation
All Extreme Left Left Right Extreme Right
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Previous Political Exp. (W) 0.344 0.475 0.194 0.395 0.462 0.499 0.526 0.499 0.094 0.292
Previous Political Exp. (M) 0.470 0.499 0.293 0.455 0.631 0.483 0.685 0.465 0.153 0.361
Age (W) 51.410 12.061 53.273 11.714 51.651 10.789 51.528 10.878 50.739 14.750
Age (M) 52.533 12.927 53.718 12.774 54.022 11.602 53.226 12.128 49.741 15.260
Farmer (W) 0.019 0.136 0.015 0.122 0.012 0.107 0.032 0.177 0.009 0.096
Intermediary Profession (W) 0.057 0.233 0.016 0.126 0.028 0.164 0.085 0.279 0.086 0.281
Private Sector Employee (W) 0.279 0.449 0.226 0.418 0.253 0.435 0.286 0.452 0.347 0.476
Liberal Occupation (W) 0.068 0.252 0.038 0.192 0.073 0.260 0.091 0.288 0.035 0.183
Education Occupation (W) 0.115 0.319 0.147 0.354 0.154 0.361 0.095 0.294 0.052 0.222
Civil Servant(W) 0.117 0.321 0.162 0.368 0.163 0.370 0.106 0.308 0.047 0.212
Public Firm Worker (W) 0.039 0.194 0.063 0.243 0.045 0.207 0.035 0.183 0.021 0.143
Other Occupation(W) 0.099 0.299 0.050 0.219 0.077 0.266 0.108 0.311 0.152 0.359
Retired (W) 0.206 0.404 0.282 0.450 0.196 0.397 0.161 0.367 0.250 0.433
Farmer (M) 0.034 0.181 0.014 0.116 0.028 0.164 0.059 0.236 0.022 0.146
Intermediary Profession (M) 0.096 0.294 0.017 0.129 0.056 0.229 0.135 0.342 0.143 0.350
Private Sector Employee (M) 0.235 0.424 0.232 0.422 0.188 0.391 0.214 0.410 0.316 0.465
Liberal Occupation (M) 0.079 0.269 0.030 0.170 0.072 0.259 0.127 0.333 0.046 0.209
Education Occupation (M) 0.104 0.306 0.147 0.355 0.133 0.339 0.070 0.255 0.069 0.254
Civil Servant(M) 0.101 0.301 0.118 0.322 0.147 0.354 0.082 0.274 0.056 0.231
Public Firm Worker (M) 0.039 0.194 0.063 0.244 0.052 0.221 0.034 0.181 0.015 0.120
Other Occupation(M) 0.054 0.226 0.044 0.205 0.046 0.209 0.055 0.229 0.061 0.239
Retired (M) 0.259 0.438 0.335 0.472 0.280 0.449 0.224 0.417 0.271 0.445
Woman First 0.506 0.500 0.502 0.500 0.496 0.500 0.524 0.500 0.502 0.500
Observations 9097 1250 2507 2714 1929
This table presents the mean and standard deviation of the characteristics of the candidates. Columns 1 and 2 report information
for the full population of candidates, while the remaining columns reported the mean and standard deviation by party.
For all parties, the share of male candidates with political experience is greater than the share of
female candidates with political experience. Incumbents were slightly more numerous among
right-wing candidates (69% of men and 53% of women) than among left-wing candidates (63%
of men an 46% of women). Only 29% of men and 19% of women were previously elected among
extreme-left candidates. These proportions shrink to respectively 15% and 9% among extreme
right candidates. Except for extreme-right candidates, the candidates of all parties were on aver-
age between 52 and 54 years old, and the male candidates are older than the female candidates.
Extreme-right candidates are younger (around 50 years old), and among them, female candi-
dates are older than male candidates. Finally, a majority of male and female candidates came
from the private sector or were retired. Civil servants and teachers were over-represented among
left-wing and extreme-left candidates, while intermediary professions were over-represented
among the right-wing candidates. Finally, we find that within each party, half of the pairs of
candidates had the female candidate listed first.
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2.2.1 Balance checks
In this section, we test the as-good-as-random nature of the order of appearance of female can-
didates on the ballots. Namely, we check whether the pairs where the female candidate is listed
first differ on observable characteristics compared to pairs where the male candidate is listed
first. For sake of brevity, we focus both on the full population of candidates, and on the subsam-
ples that we will use later in our analysis.
As we argue in the next section, in order to identify causal effects of the treatment, our estimation
needs to satisfy the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which states that the poten-
tial outcomes of a unit are not affected by the treatment status of another unit. This hypothesis is
likely to be violated if we consider altogether several candidates from a same precinct. Indeed,
let us assume that the treatment affects negatively a given pair of candidates. One can therefore
imagine that the votes they lost positively affected another pair of candidates from the same
precinct (especially if the voters reacting to the treatment are non-partisan).
In order to avoid such a scenario, we run an analysis on different samples of pairs of candidates
having the same partisan affiliation, and being the sole pair of candidates of their party in their
precinct. Such subsamples meet the SUTVA assumption: while it is possible that these candi-
dates are affected by the treatment status of candidates of other parties, they cannot be affected
by the treatment status of other units in the sample.
In Table 2, we systematically test for imbalances, both on the whole population of candidates
and on the subsamples of interest. To do so, using a logistic model, we regress the dummy
variable indicating whether the female candidate is listed first on the whole set of individual
characteristics. Overall, whether we consider the full population of candidates or the restricted
subsamples, even though some variables appear to have a significant effect. the characteristics
of the candidates explain very few (if any) of the variance of the treatment variable, and they
are not jointly significant. No imbalances are found for extreme-left and right-wing candidates
candidates. Among left-wing pairs, women are more likely to be listed first on the ballot if they
work in intermediary professions or are retired, and if the male candidate is an retired. Finally,
among extreme-right candidates, younger female candidates are more likely to be on the top of
the ballot. So do female candidates who are retired or working in liberal occupation. Women
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paired with male candidates working in intermediary professions and in the education sector
are less likely to be at the top of the ballot. Yet, overall, the absence of joint significance suggests
that if any selection into the treatment based on the characteristics of the candidates exists, it is
of low magnitude.
2.3 Manipulation of the treatment
An important related question is whether parties selected male and female candidates in order
to have male candidates at the top of the ballot. In this case, we should observe that the distribu-
tion of first letters of surnames are different across gender. In Figure 2, we plot the frequency of
the first letter of surnames for male and female candidates, both on the total population of can-
didates and on our subsamples of interest: in all cases, the distributions are strikingly similar.
In Table 3, we formalize this graphical intuition by performing different tests of equal distri-
butions. Namely, we perform the tests of Kolmogorov-Smirnov, of equality of medians, and
of Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon. Overall, for all the tests and all the samples of interest, we can-
not reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are identical. The only exception is for the
restricted subsamples of left-wing candidates, where the distributions seem slightly different :
the Kolmogorov Test and the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test reject the hypothesis of equal dis-
tributions at the 10% level. But as Figure 2c shows, this difference seems mainly driven by an
over-representation of women with names beginning by the letter B, and is unlikely to represent
a more general manipulation of the treatment. This suggests that parties did not strategically
chose to match candidates based on their surnames. Finally, as additional checks for the absence
of manipulation of the treatment, we report in Annex the share of votes received by candidates
in the first round depending on the first letter of the candidates’ surnames: we find that, for each
first letter of the candidates’ surnames, the share of votes is very close to the sample average.
2.4 Data on ballot layout
An important feature of the French electoral law is that it allows candidates to add additional
information about themselves on the ballot, so long as it does not confuse the voter about their
identity. In order to account for this specificity, we manually collected data on the electoral bal-
12
Table 2: Determinants of the treatment (Total population of candidates and restricted samples)
Restricted Samples
Woman First All Extreme Left Left Right Extreme Right
Previous Political Exp. (W) 0.078 0.070 0.019 0.102 0.134
(0.050) (0.151) (0.115) (0.117) (0.171)
Previous Political Exp. (M) -0.016 0.120 0.044 -0.228 -0.197
(0.051) (0.133) (0.130) (0.142) (0.136)
Age (W) -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 0.005 -0.009
(0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)**
Age (M) -0.001 0.007 0.001 -0.008 -0.001
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Intermediary Profession (W) 0.260 -0.040 0.712 0.381 0.319
(0.105)** (0.501) (0.403)* (0.238) (0.198)
Private Sector Employee (W) 0.148 0.173 0.335 0.155 0.184
(0.072)** (0.257) (0.227) (0.180) (0.141)
Liberal Occupation (W) 0.369 0.187 0.458 0.370 0.670
(0.106)*** (0.373) (0.288) (0.227) (0.286)**
Education Occupation (W) 0.103 0.112 0.377 -0.059 0.100
(0.088) (0.274) (0.241) (0.245) (0.243)
Civil Servant(W) 0.103 0.058 0.319 -0.030 0.389
(0.088) (0.270) (0.240) (0.225) (0.244)
Public Firm Worker (W) 0.098 0.200 0.274 0.053 -0.304
(0.121) (0.329) (0.339) (0.322) (0.349)
Retired (W) 0.076 -0.228 0.486 -0.064 0.531
(0.086) (0.271) (0.256)* (0.216) (0.177)***
Intermediary Profession (M) 0.019 0.379 0.681 0.055 -0.390
(0.100) (0.553) (0.327)** (0.226) (0.207)*
Private Sector Employee (M) 0.045 0.209 0.106 0.042 -0.292
(0.085) (0.276) (0.241) (0.197) (0.186)
Liberal Occupation (M) 0.057 0.136 0.290 -0.036 -0.088
(0.104) (0.421) (0.290) (0.215) (0.276)
Education Occupation (M) -0.036 0.046 0.398 -0.157 -0.432
(0.100) (0.294) (0.251) (0.260) (0.250)*
Civil Servant(M) -0.077 -0.174 0.259 -0.199 -0.317
(0.099) (0.301) (0.245) (0.246) (0.256)
Public Firm Worker (M) -0.043 -0.195 0.202 -0.249 -0.553
(0.128) (0.343) (0.316) (0.331) (0.430)
Retired (M) 0.028 -0.098 0.207 0.187 -0.264









Pseudo R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Chi2 29.35 18.43 11.83 16.72 22.13
N 9,081 1,187 1,341 1,389 1,883
Logistic Regressions. Column 1 considers all candidates. In columns 2 to 5 each subsample considers only the candidates
who are the only ones of the considered party in the precinct where they run. The outcome is a variable equal to one if the
female candidate is first on the ballot and zero otherwise. The coefficients on male and female candidates’ occupations are
expressed considering farmers and other occupations as the reference modality. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the precinct level in column 1, and robust in columns 2 to 5.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Figure 2: Distribution of surname initials across gender and parties
(a) Total population of candidates
(b) Restricted Sample: Extreme Left (c) Restricted Sample: Left
(d) Restricted Sample: Right (e) Restricted Sample: Extreme Right14
Table 3: Tests of equal distributions of surnames initials
Restricted samples
P-Value All Extreme-Left Left Right Extreme-Right
KS 0.211 0.782 0.094∗ 0.855 0.377
Median 0.320 0.774 0.132 0.622 0.474
MWW 0.385 0.652 0.0546∗ 0.583 0.372
The table presents the P-values of three tests of equal distributions: Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS), non-parametric test of equality of medians (Median), and Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
rank-sum test (MWW). The null hypothesis is that the distributions of first letters in the
surnames is the same across male and female candidates. Column 1 considers all candi-
dates. In columns 2 to 5, each subsample considers only the candidates who are the only
ones of the considered party in the precinct where they run.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
lots that were used for these elections. While there does not exist a systematic recording of elec-
toral ballots for the local elections in France, we could access a sample corresponding to about
12% of the electoral ballots of the considered elections. To do so, we used three types of data.
First, the Centre for Political Research of SciencesPo (CEVIPOF) provided 780 ballots. Secondly,
exploiting the fact that some departments recorded a numeric version of the ballots (namely the
departments of Allier, Aude, Ille-et-Villaine, Loire-Atlantique and Savoie), we systematically
contacted the administrative centers in charge of the election. We managed to recover 168 bal-
lots from the Loire-Atlantique department. Finally, we systematically looked up for pictures of
ballots on the Internet, using Google, Twitter and Facebook keywords7. Using this methodology,
we managed to recover 191 full ballots.
To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first effort to collect and analyze ballot lay-
outs in a systematic way. Yet, because our dataset is not complete, it might be subject to biases.
In particular, because the data collected by the Centre for Political Research of Sciences Po are
based on voluntary contributions of voters, it tends to over represent precincts located in urban
areas. Secondly, online data might over-represent famous candidates, who might be more likely
to campaign online. On the other hand, it might also allow candidates without a strong visibility
to get a wider audience. In Table 4, we regress the availability of the ballot on the main charac-
teristics of the candidates for each of the subsamples of interest, using a logistic regression.
Overall, we find differences in terms of age and socio professional categories. The ballots we
analyze are indeed those of slightly younger candidates, especially among left-wing candidates.
7Using in particular requests such as "Bulletins de vote élections départementales 2015", or other versions of it.
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Table 4: Determinants of ballot availability
Restricted Samples
Ballot Availability All Extreme Left Left Right Extreme Right
Woman First -0.056 -0.057 -0.085 -0.172 -0.014
(0.064) (0.190) (0.172) (0.169) (0.145)
Previous Political Exp. (W) -0.119 0.128 -0.088 -0.104 0.092
(0.076) (0.236) (0.175) (0.176) (0.259)
Previous Political Exp. (M) -0.084 -0.114 -0.140 0.067 0.024
(0.075) (0.213) (0.184) (0.215) (0.209)
Age (W) -0.004 -0.012 -0.019 -0.002 0.004
(0.003) (0.010) (0.010)* (0.010) (0.007)
Age (M) -0.009 -0.009 -0.029 -0.006 0.002
(0.003)*** (0.010) (0.009)*** (0.009) (0.006)
Intermediary Profession (W) -0.186 -1.194 -0.712 -0.169 -0.282
(0.178) (1.086) (0.804) (0.339) (0.322)
Private Sector Employee (W) 0.150 -0.453 -0.113 -0.549 0.048
(0.113) (0.381) (0.366) (0.262)** (0.217)
Liberal Occupation (W) 0.312 0.797 -0.013 0.010 0.196
(0.150)** (0.474)* (0.470) (0.309) (0.413)
Education Occupation (W) 0.289 -0.219 0.416 0.070 0.299
(0.131)** (0.391) (0.372) (0.331) (0.352)
Civil Servant(W) 0.031 -0.238 0.475 -0.597 -0.219
(0.137) (0.388) (0.366) (0.352)* (0.397)
Public Firm Worker (W) 0.271 -0.419 0.318 -0.121 0.271
(0.179) (0.519) (0.495) (0.462) (0.478)
Retired (W) 0.014 -0.501 0.498 -0.690 -0.144
(0.136) (0.416) (0.400) (0.346)** (0.272)
Intermediary Profession (M) 0.363 0.922 -0.616 0.084 1.085
(0.149)** (0.780) (0.520) (0.343) (0.411)***
Private Sector Employee (M) 0.254 0.793 -0.342 0.010 0.772
(0.131)* (0.462)* (0.341) (0.302) (0.388)**
Liberal Occupation (M) 0.163 0.812 -0.066 -0.053 0.866
(0.162) (0.634) (0.411) (0.326) (0.503)*
Education Occupation (M) 0.178 -0.382 -0.273 -0.087 1.520
(0.151) (0.539) (0.358) (0.397) (0.437)***
Civil Servant(M) 0.203 0.049 -0.364 0.252 1.342
(0.152) (0.526) (0.355) (0.364) (0.452)***
Public Firm Worker (M) 0.381 0.241 -0.094 -0.163 1.074
(0.188)** (0.576) (0.438) (0.538) (0.662)
Retired (M) 0.077 0.285 -0.309 -0.059 0.740









Pseudo R2 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
Chi2 71.04 35.94 39.82 17.28 24.68
N 9,081 1,187 1,341 1,389 1,883
Logistic Regressions. Column 1 considers all candidates. In columns 2 to 5 each subsample considers only the candidates who are
the only ones of the considered party in the precinct where they run. The outcome is a variable equal to one if we could observe
the ballot and zero otherwise. The coefficients on male and female candidates’ occupations are expressed considering farmers and
other occupations as the reference modality. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the precinct level in column 1, and
robust in columns 2 to 5.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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At the extreme-left, we observe more ballots when the female candidate has a liberal occupation,
and when the male candidate is working in the private sector. Among right-wing candidates,
ballots are more likely to be observed if the female candidate is working in the private sector or
as a civil servant, or is retired. Finally, among extreme-right candidates, imbalances are found
on most of male occupations (except for public firm workers). Nevertheless, three important
comments need to be made. First and foremost, the position of the female candidate is not
predictive of the availability of the ballot. Second, while some differences are significant, they
explain a small share of ballot availability, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of joint
nullity of the estimates for the restricted samples of right-wing and extreme-right candidates.
Finally, no party seems to be over-represented in the sample.
In Table 5, we provide evidence that the treatment status is uncorrelated with the reporting
decision and the kind of information reported. We categorized the type of information into
three types: declared past or present political experience, age and occupation. Moreover, since it
is possible to put the picture of the candidates on the ballot, we identified the pairs of candidates
who did so. We observe, that out of 1,139 ballots available, 36% have some kind of information
reported for at least one candidate : 35% of the ballots report information related to the male
candidate and 33% report information related to the female candidate. 26% of the ballots report
information related to the political experience of the male candidate and 22% report information
related to the political experience of the female candidate. 5% of male candidates report their
occupations, while it is the case of 7% of female candidates. Less than 1% of male and female
candidates report their age. Finally, about 9% of the candidates put their picture on the ballot.
We also observe that the decision to report any information is very correlated between male and
female candidates: out of 412 ballots with at least one information, 88% report information for
both candidates. Importantly, none of these reporting decisions are correlated to the treatment.
3 Estimation strategy
Our main estimation strategy aims at analyzing whether candidates lose or gain from having
the female candidate first on the ballot.
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Table 5: Balance check on reported information: all candidates
Man First N Woman First N Diff T-Stat
At least one information 0.362 575 0.362 564 0.000 0.001
At least one information (M) 0.348 575 0.351 564 -0.003 -0.114
At least one information (W) 0.327 575 0.340 564 -0.013 -0.481
Information: Political Experience (M) 0.268 575 0.253 564 0.014 0.548
Information: Political Experience (W) 0.221 575 0.220 564 0.001 0.041
Information: Occupation (M) 0.050 575 0.060 564 -0.010 -0.726
Information: Occupation (W) 0.066 575 0.070 564 -0.005 -0.323
Information: Age (M) 0.009 575 0.005 564 0.003 0.682
Information: Age (W) 0.009 575 0.005 564 0.003 0.682
Photo 0.090 575 0.092 564 -0.002 -0.103
This table presents T-Tests of difference of information reporting across treatment status for the full sample of available ballots
In an initial specification, we test whether, on average, the electoral performances of pairs where
the female candidate is first on the ballot are different from those where the male candidate is
first. Identification takes place within the potential outcomes framework from the Rubin Causal
Model, where we assume two potential outcomes for each unit i - Yi(0) and Yi(1) - and the causal
effect of the program on the unit i is defined as τi = Yi(1)− Yi(0). The actual observed outcome
is defined as such:
Y obsi =
 Yi(0) if Ti = 0Yi(1) if Ti = 1
In this framework, the Average Treatment Effect is defined as ATE = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)]. A naive
estimate of this quantity is given by Y obs1 − Y obs0 . In general, such a quantity is unbiased under
the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) and the complete randomization assumption.
As explained above, the SUTVA is likely to be violated if we do not restrict our analysis to a
sample of observations which cannot interact with each other (meaning that the treatment status
of one observation will not affect the outcome of any other unit). To do so, we therefore restrict
our analysis to candidates who are the only ones to represent their party in the precinct.
The second assumption states that both the potential outcomes and the covariates are indepen-
dent from the treatment. Formally, the condition writes as such:
Ti ⊥ (Yi(0), Yi(1), Xi)
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In our setting, the treatment-assignment is based on a procedure which is supposedly as-good-
as-random, since the order of the candidates (and hence the place of the female candidate) on the
ballot is determined by alphabetical order. However, as we have shown in the last section, while
the treatment assignment is hardly affected by candidates’ characteristics, the covariates are not
systematically perfectly balanced across treatment status. In our setting, it therefore seems more
plausible to assume the milder assumption of unconfoundedness, which states that the potential
outcomes and the treatment are independent after controlling for covariates potentially affecting
them. Formally, this assumption writes:
Ti ⊥ (Yi(0), Yi(1))|Xi
Our baseline OLS specification is therefore the following:
Yi = α+ βTi + δXi + i (1)
where Yi is an outcome variable indicating the electoral performance of pair i, Ti is the treatment
variable, which is equal to 1 if the female candidate in pair i is first on the ballot and 0 otherwise,
Xi is a set of candidates characteristics, and i is an error term.
While our main specification does not model how the electoral performance of a pair of can-
didates depends on the characteristics of the other candidates, in additional specifications we
control for the average characteristics of the opponents of the considered pair, and compare the
results of the different candidates pairwise.
4 Results
4.1 Main estimation
In this section, we present our main results, by estimating equation (1). In order to do so, we
compare the scores received by candidates in the first round of the election in the control and
in the treatment group. Note that in this setting, the number of candidates is not identical in
each precinct, and the scores of pairs facing different are therefore not directly comparable. In
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order to make the electoral performances comparable across different number of candidates, we
control in each regression for the number of candidates competing in the precinct.
In Table 6, we test whether the order of the candidates affect the electoral performance of the
pairs. It summarizes the estimates of such an average treatment effect across several specifi-
cations. Panel (A) reports results without any controls except the number of candidates in the
precinct. Panel (B) reports results when we also control for individual characteristics. Panel (C)
involves the same control variables, but interacts the characteristics of male and female candi-
dates. Panel (D) is similar to the third one, but also controls for precinct characteristics (including
the average age of the population, the share of voters in rural areas, the share of voters with at
least an undergraduate degree, and the unemployment rate, all as of 2013), and for the first letter
of the female’s surname.
Overall, the results suggest that the performances of extreme-left, left-wing and extreme-right
pairs are not affected by the order of appearance of the candidates. However, right-wing pairs
lose a sizable share of votes if the female candidate is first. Estimates of the loss range between
1.4 and 1.9 points, representing between 4 and 5.4 percents of the average vote share. Impor-
tantly, the magnitude of the coefficient is very similar across the specifications, and especially
stable in all the specifications including covariates, suggesting that the inclusion of covariates
hardly affects the general pattern.
This discrimination had a substantial electoral impact. In Table 7, we show that gender discrim-
ination prevented some right-wing pairs of candidates from winning the election. More specif-
ically we regress a dummy variable indicating whether the considered pair reached the second
round or won the election during the first round. Panel (A) includes no control except the num-
ber of competing candidates. Panel (B) includes the broadest set of controls - namely, interacted
individual characteristics from the candidates, number of competing candidates, precinct char-
acteristics and the first letter of the woman’s surname. We find that right-wing candidates were
between 3.9 and 4.9 percentage points less likely to reach the second round or win the election
in the first round, corresponding to a lower probability ranging between 4.7 and 5.9 percents.
This gender bias seems to have affected the final result of the election. In Table 8, we regress a
dummy indicating whether the considered pair won the election on the treatment status. Con-
trols are defined in the same way as in Table 7. Overall, we find that, because of gender dis-
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Table 6: Effect on share of votes in the first round
(A) XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First 0.381 -0.291 -1.878 0.035
(0.396) (0.536) (0.536)*** (0.348)
R2 0.15 0.14 0.28 0.09
N 1,188 1,341 1,391 1,893
Indiv. Controls N N N N
Precinct characteristics N N N N
First letter of the woman’s surname N N N N
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(B) XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First 0.084 -0.206 -1.589 0.066
(0.350) (0.480) (0.497)*** (0.327)
R2 0.35 0.32 0.40 0.22
N 1,187 1,341 1,389 1,883
Indiv. Controls Y Y Y Y
Precinct characteristics N N N N
First letter of the woman’s surname N N N N
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(C) XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First 0.123 -0.149 -1.583 0.122
(0.364) (0.492) (0.511)*** (0.335)
R2 0.39 0.37 0.43 0.25
N 1,187 1,341 1,389 1,883
Indiv. Controls Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics N N N N
First letter of the woman’s surname N N N N
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(D) XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First -0.085 -0.206 -1.397 0.429
(0.420) (0.586) (0.581)** (0.378)
R2 0.43 0.41 0.49 0.38
N 1,187 1,334 1,389 1,882
Indiv. Controls Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics Y Y Y Y
First letter of the woman’s surname Y Y Y Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
Mean of Outcome Variable 10.66 28.44 34.91 25.79
OLS Regressions. Each subsample considers only the candidates who are the only ones of the con-
sidered party in the precinct where they run. The outcome variable is the share of votes received by
each pair of candidates in the first round of the election. Panel (A) controls only for the number of
candidates in the precinct. Panel (B) also controls for age, socioprofessional categories and political
experience of male and female candidates. Panel (C) controls for the same variables but interacts the
age of man and woman, the socioprofessional categories of man and woman, and the political expe-
rience of man and woman. Panel (D) adds to these controls the first letter of the woman’s surname,
as well as the unemployment rate, the average age of the population, the share of individuals with
a graduate degree and the share of voters living in rural areas within the precincts. Robust standard
errors between parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 7: Effect on probability of getting to the second round or of winning the
election in the first round
(A) XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First 0.015 0.002 -0.049 -0.004
(0.013) (0.026) (0.020)** (0.023)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01
N 1,188 1,341 1,391 1,893
Indiv. Controls N N N N
Precinct characteristics N N N N
First letter of the woman’s surname N N N N
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(B) XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First 0.010 0.013 -0.039 0.002
(0.015) (0.030) (0.022)* (0.026)
R2 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.22
N 1,187 1,334 1,389 1,882
Indiv. Controls Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics Y Y Y Y
First letter of the woman’s surname Y Y Y Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
Mean of the Outcome Variable 0.058 0.64 0.83 0.58
OLS Regressions. Each subsample considers only the candidates who are the only ones of the con-
sidered party in the precinct where they run. The outcome variable is a dummy variable indicating
whether the pair of candidates went to the second round of the election or was elected in the first
round. Panel (A) controls only for the number of candidates in the precinct. Panel (B) also controls
for interacted age of man and woman, interacted socioprofessional categories of man and woman,
interacted political experience of man and woman, the first letter of the woman’s surname, as well
as the unemployment rate, the average age of the population, the share of individuals with a gradu-
ate degree and the share of voters living in rural areas within the precincts. Robust standard errors
between parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Effect on probability of being elected
(A) XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First 0.006 -0.016 -0.045 -0.001
(0.012) (0.026) (0.026)* (0.006)
R2 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01
N 1,188 1,341 1,391 1,893
Indiv. Controls N N N N
Precinct characteristics N N N N
First letter of the woman’s surname N N N N
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(B) XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First 0.002 -0.016 -0.040 0.006
(0.014) (0.032) (0.031) (0.007)
R2 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.14
N 1,187 1,334 1,389 1,882
Indiv. Controls Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics Y Y Y Y
First letter of the woman’s surname Y Y Y Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
Mean of the Outcome Variable 0.044 0.35 0.57 0.016
OLS Regressions. Each subsample considers only the candidates who are the only ones of the con-
sidered party in the precinct where they run. The outcome variable is a dummy variable indicating
whether the pair of candidates eventually won the election. Panel (A) controls only for the number
of candidates in the precinct. Panel (B) also controls for interacted age of man and woman, inter-
acted socioprofessional categories of man and woman, interacted political experience of man and
woman, the first letter of the woman’s surname, as well as the unemployment rate, the average age
of the population, the share of individuals with a graduate degree and the share of voters living in
rural areas within the precincts. Robust standard errors between parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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crimination, right-wing pairs of candidates were between 4 and 4.5 points less likely to win the
election. An important point is that the magnitude of the results is exactly the same as the mag-
nitude observed when we considered the probability of going to the second round or winning
the election in the first round. It suggests that the overall effect is channeled through the proba-
bility of reaching the second. In fact, we find no treatment effect during the second round8. This
additional noise explains why our results are less significant: the simplest specification only
yields significance at the 10% level, and the treatment effect is not significant anymore when we
include covariates - even though the point estimates are very stable.
4.2 Alternative specifications
4.2.1 Full Sample
In Table 9, we run the same baseline model on the full population of candidates. While in such
a setting we cannot exclude that the SUTVA is violated, it provides consistent evidence that our
main estimates are not an artifact of our sample selection. Panel (A) reports average treatment
effects on the vote shares during the first round on the population of candidates in each of the
four specifications detailed in our main estimation - controlling in each of them for the party of
the candidate. We find no evidence of treatment effects whatsoever.
However, when we interact the treatment with a dummy indicating that the pair of candidates
is from the right-wing, we find a strongly negative interaction term, of the same magnitude than
the one found in the main specification (i.e. between -1.4 and -1.5 percentage points).
4.2.2 Opponents’ characteristics and dyadic estimation
In this section, we check that our estimates are not affected by the characteristics of the political
opponents faced by a given pair of candidates. In Table 10, we run the most stringent regression
of the main specification - including interacted individual characteristics, the first letter of the fe-
male’s surname and the characteristics of the precinct - controlling for the average characteristics
of the male and female opponents on the age, political experience and occupation dimensions,
as well as for the share of opponents with a female candidate listed first. We still find a statisti-
8These results are available upon request.
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Table 9: OLS estimation on Full Sample
(A) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Woman first -0.117 -0.191 -0.172 -0.187
(0.210) (0.185) (0.186) (0.226)
R2 0.40 0.54 0.54 0.55
N 9,097 9,081 9,081 9,018
Indiv. Controls N Y Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics N N N Y
First letter of the woman’s surname N N N Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(B) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Woman First 0.445 0.489 0.443 0.432
(0.492) (0.493) (0.502) (0.506)
Extreme Left -1.286 -1.070 -1.041 -0.910
(0.447)*** (0.440)** (0.444)** (0.438)**
Left 12.081 8.007 7.988 7.972
(0.465)*** (0.451)*** (0.456)*** (0.449)***
Right 15.981 11.044 11.064 11.076
(0.508)*** (0.497)*** (0.499)*** (0.494)***
Extreme Right 12.703 14.880 14.845 14.989
(0.459)*** (0.461)*** (0.466)*** (0.462)***
Woman First*Extreme Left 0.048 -0.383 -0.351 -0.338
(0.628) (0.609) (0.617) (0.607)
Woman First*Left -0.143 -0.452 -0.388 -0.426
(0.649) (0.618) (0.627) (0.617)
Woman First*Right -1.510 -1.464 -1.389 -1.418
(0.695)** (0.654)** (0.659)** (0.646)**
Woman First*Extreme Right -0.378 -0.313 -0.214 -0.163
(0.629) (0.609) (0.619) (0.615)
R2 0.40 0.54 0.54 0.55
N 9,097 9,081 9,081 9,018
Indiv. Controls N Y Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics N N N Y
First letter of the woman’s surname N N N Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
OLS Regressions. All columns consider the full population of candidates. The outcome variable is the share of
votes received by each pair of candidates in the first round of the election. Panel (A) presents the treatment effect
on the full population. Panel (B) interacts this treatment with the party of the candidates.ts the treatment with
the party of the candidate. Column (1) controls only for the number of candidates in the precinct and the party
of each candidate. Column (2) also controls for age, socioprofessional categories and political experience of male
and female candidates. Column (3) controls for the same variables but interacts the age of man and woman, the
socioprofessional categories of man and woman, and the political experience of man and woman. Column (4)
adds to these controls the first letter of the woman’s surname, as well as the unemployment rate, the average age
of the population, the share of individuals with a graduate degree and the share of voters living in rural areas
within the precincts. Clustered standard errors at the precinct level in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 10: Effect on votes in the first round, controlling for average character-
istics of opponents
Share of votes in the first round XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First 0.064 0.267 -1.065 0.427
(0.401) (0.537) (0.512)** (0.375)
R2 0.48 0.52 0.59 0.40
N 1,187 1,333 1,387 1,882
Indiv. Controls Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics Y Y Y Y
First letter of the woman’s surname Y Y Y Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
Mean of opponents’ characterics Y Y Y Y
OLS Regressions. Each subsample considers only the candidates who are the only ones of the con-
sidered party in the precinct where they run. The outcome variable is the share of votes received by
each pair of candidates in the first round of the election. Each regression controls for the number of
candidates in the precinct, the interacted age of man and woman, interacted socioprofessional cate-
gories of man and woman, interacted political experience of man and woman, the first letter of the
woman’s surname, and the average of each of these variables among the competing candidates in the
precinct. It also controls for the unemployment rate, the average age of the population, the share of
individuals with a graduate degree and the share of voters living in rural areas within the precincts.
Robust standard errors between parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
cally significant effect on the restricted sample of right-wing candidates, even though the effect
is smaller and drops down to 1 percentage point.
Finally, in order to take into account more thoroughly the structure of the political competition,
we compute for each pair of candidates the difference between their score and the score of each
of their opponents in the first round of the election. We then regress the relative score between
the considered pair and its considered opponent on their respective characteristics and treatment
statuses.
Formally, we therefore run the following estimation:
Yij = α+ βTi + γT
′
j + δXi + νX
′
j + ij (2)
where Yij is the difference between the score of the pair i and the score of the pair j, Ti is the
treatment status of pair i, T
′
j is the treatment status of pair j, Xi is a set of characteristics of pair
i, X
′
j is a set of characteristics of pair j, and ij is an error term.
We run the specifications in the same fashion as in the main specification. Panel (A) controls
only for the number of competing candidates. Panel (B) controls for the characteristics of each
dyad of pairs. Panel (C) controls for the same characteristics, but interacting them within each
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pair of the dyad. Finally, panel (D) adds as controls the first letter of each woman in the dyad,
and the sociodemographic characteristics of the precinct.
The results of this estimation are gathered in Table 11. The results look very similar to the main
estimation: we do not find any treatment effect for extreme-left, left-wing and right-wing can-
didates, but we do a find a negative treatment effect for right-wing candidates, corresponding
to between -1.4 and -2 percentage points. To the contrary, we do not find, in any of the specifi-
cations, that the treatment status of the considered opponent affects the score of the considered
pair.
5 Channels
5.1 Taste-based or statistical discrimination ?
How can this observed gender discrimination be explained ? On the one hand, voters may be
reluctant to vote for women, regardless of their characteristics or quality. We would then talk, in
the spirit of Becker (1957), of taste-based discrimination. On the other hand, if the characteristics
and quality of candidates are not perfectly observable by the voters, they might apply potentially
negative group stereotypes on the female candidate. In that case, we would then talk, following
the seminal contributions of Arrow et al. (1973) and Phelps (1972), of statistical discrimination.
In this section, in the spirit of Altonji and Pierret (2001), we show evidence pointing towards the
presence of statistical discrimination.
It is worth noticing that, in our particular setting, testing properly for the presence of statistical
discrimination needs to cope with an additional element: the limited-attention bias from the
voters. As we explained above, according to the electoral law, two elected candidates from a
same ballot have exactly the same prerogatives once in office: there is no hierarchy between
them. In this light, had voters perfectly known this framework, they should not have been
influenced by the relative positions of the two candidates of the ballot.
In such a framework, testing for statistical discrimination requires a shifter of information that
affects the knowledge that the voters have of candidates, while keeping the level of information
about the electoral rule constant. To do so, we exploit an additional feature of the electoral
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Table 11: Results: Dyadic Specification
(A) XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First 0.595 -0.384 -2.058 -0.020
(0.482) (0.675) (0.702)*** (0.463)
Woman First (Opponent) 0.193 0.105 -0.391 0.072
(0.404) (0.504) (0.498) (0.377)
R2 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.07
N 4,450 4,413 4,333 6,603
Indiv. Controls N N N N
Indiv. Controls (Opponent) N N N N
Precinct characteristics N N N N
First letter of the woman’s surname N N N N
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(B) XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First 0.163 -0.002 -1.442 -0.060
(0.432) (0.537) (0.567)** (0.13)
Woman First (Opponent) 0.075 0.483 -0.160 0.312
(0.325) (0.381) (0.374) (1.03)
R2 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.40
N 4,438 4,406 4,316 6,569
Indiv. Controls Y Y Y Y
Indiv. Controls (Opponent) Y Y Y Y
Precinct characteristics N N N N
First letter of the woman’s surname N N N N
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(C) XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First 0.110 0.042 -1.603 0.042
(0.444) (0.543) (0.574)*** (0.466)
Woman First (Opponent) 0.017 0.470 -0.062 0.217
(0.330) (0.372) (0.375) (0.306)
R2 0.43 0.50 0.47 0.42
N 4,438 4,406 4,316 6,569
Indiv. Controls Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Indiv. Controls (Opponent) Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics N N N N
First letter of the woman’s surname N N N N
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(D) XLeft Left Right XRight
Woman First -0.049 0.315 -1.460 0.409
(0.513) (0.660) (0.635)** (0.504)
Woman First (Opponent) 0.067 0.530 0.087 0.189
(0.326) (0.371) (0.363) (0.288)
R2 0.45 0.51 0.51 0.48
N 4,438 4,406 4,316 6,569
Indiv. Controls Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Indiv. Controls (Opponent) Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics Y Y Y Y
First letter of the woman’s surname Y Y Y Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
OLS Regressions. Each subsample considers only the candidates who are the only ones of the consid-
ered party in the precinct where they run, and compares them to all of their political opponents. The
outcome variable is the difference between the share of votes of the considered pair and the share of the
considered competing pair. Panel (A) controls only for the number of candidates in the precinct. Panel
(B) also controls for age, socioprofessional categories and political experience of man and woman,
within the considered pair and the competing pair, as well as for the party of the competing pair. Panel
(C) controls for the same variables but interacts the age of man and woman, the socioprofessional cat-
egories of man and woman, and the political experience of man and woman within the considered
pair and the competing pair. Panel (D) adds to these controls the first letter of the woman’s surname
in the considered pair, as well as the unemployment rate, the average age of the population, the share
of individuals with a graduate degree and the share of voters living in rural areas within the precincts.
Standard errors clustered at the precinct level between parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 28
rule, that allows candidates to report additional information on the ballot. Importantly, this
additional information is only about the candidate herself, and is not informative about the
rule of the election. Consequently, it is unlikely to affect the understanding that a voter has
about the general rules of the election. Using this information we test whether, conditional
on characteristics that we can observe thanks to administrative data but which might not be
observed by the voters, discrimination is lower when these information are revealed on the
ballot.
It is important to notice that, in the theory of statistical discrimination, individuals have imper-
fect information about the quality of the people they face. Contrarily to some settings where
quality is easily observable (such as transaction data on the housing market, for example Laoué-
nan and Rathelot (2017)) getting a proper measure of the quality of a politician is difficult. Most
of the literature on the topic proxied the quality of politicians with their education level (Fer-
raz and Finan (2009), Besley et al. (2011), Daniele and Geys (2015) among others), or with the
performance of their constituency (Alesina et al. (2015), Daniele and Vertier (2016)). However,
recent contributions found new ways of measuring political competence, notably through earn-
ings and IQ score (Besley et al. (2017a), Dal Bó et al. (2017)). In our study, we do not observe
such characteristics, nor the actual performance of previously elected leaders in office: hence the
extent to which we can control for the quality of politicians is limited. However, the information
we have on candidates embeds part of it, since it includes previous political experience.
In Table 12, we show that reporting information matters for electoral results. For sake of brevity,
we only present results on the whole sample of ballots that we could manually recover. Here
again, we explain the share of votes received in the first round and present different specifica-
tions, with an increasing number of controls, and controlling in each of them for the number of
candidates in the precinct and the party of the considered pair of candidates. The results pre-
sented in this table cannot be interpreted as causal, since the fact of reporting information might
be correlated to unobservable characteristics which also matter for electoral success. Neverthe-
less, it is indicative of the role that information might play in the electoral process.
Overall, we find that, conditional on observed characteristics, the ballots which report at least
one type of information for at least one candidate receive between 2.4 and 2.6 points more than
their counterparts. This advantage seems to be coming from reported information about political
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Table 12: Ballots with reported information gain more votes
(A) - Full Sample of available ballots (1) (2) (3) (4)




Any information on political experience 3.279
(0.749)***
Any information on occupation -0.801
(1.123)
R2 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.55
N 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138
Indiv. Controls Y Y Y Y
Precinct characteristics N N N N
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(B) - Full Sample of available ballots (1) (2) (3) (4)




Any information on political experience 3.049
(0.789)***
Any information on occupation -0.949
(1.166)
R2 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.57
N 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138
Indiv. Controls Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics N N N N
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(C) - Full Sample of available ballots (1) (2) (3) (4)




Any information on political experience 3.151
(0.792)***
Any information on occupation -0.876
(1.157)
R2 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.57
N 1,137 1,137 1,137 1,137
Indiv. Controls Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics Y Y Y Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
OLS Regressions. Each column considers the full sample of candidates for which we could observe a ballot.
The outcome variable is the share of votes received by the pair of candidates in the first round of the election.
Panel (A) controls for the number of candidates in the precinct, as well as the age, socioprofessional categories
and political experience of male and female candidates. Panel (B) controls for the same variables but interacts
the age of man and woman, the socioprofessional categories of man and woman, and the political experience of
man and woman. Panel (C) adds to these controls the unemployment rate, the average age of the population,
the share of individuals with a graduate degree and the share of voters living in rural areas within the precincts.
Clustered standard errors at the precinct level in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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experience: if at least one of the candidates mentions such experience on the ballot, the pair gains
between 3 and 3.2 percentage points more. Conversely, if any of the candidates mentions her
occupation or prints her picture, they do not seem to have an advantage9.
In Table 13, we show how reported information affects discrimination against right-wing women
in the first round of the election. Namely, we evaluate whether displaying information on the
ballot affects the discrimination faced by right-wing female candidates. To do so, we interact
the treatment variable with a dummy indicating whether any type of information is available
on the ballot. In this case, we observe that, for right-wing candidates, discrimination disappears
when information is displayed on the ballot: while, on ballots with no information, discrimina-
tion seems to be particularly high - with about 5 to 5.8 points less of received votes when the
female candidate is listed first - this effect is totally cancelled out when at least one information
about the candidates is revealed. This result holds for all the specifications even after control-
ling for individual and locals characteristics. Therefore, it suggests the presence of statistical
discrimination.
Such a finding could be explained by the historically low representation of women among right-
wing politicians - since, as the literature on the topic as shown (Beaman et al. (2009), De Paola
et al. (2010)), exposure to women in office increases the probability of voting for them in the
future. As a matter of fact, the main right-wing party has often preferred to field male candidates
in various types of elections - notably during the parliamentary elections of the decade 2000
which were subject to gender quotas - while other parties were more compliant.
In the following paragraphs, we explore whether alternative explanations are likely to explain
our results.
5.2 Are candidates with political experience less likely to be discriminated ?
One might worry that the difference of vote shares that we observe when a female is listed first
or second only reflect the differences of underlying characteristics existing between them. Let
us assume that voters believe that the first candidate is the "main" candidate and that they do
not have a preference over the gender of this candidate. If the quality of female candidates is
9Note that, because of bunching of information reporting, both by gender and by type of information, disentan-
gling the impact of information by gender and by type is hardly feasible in our setting.
31
Table 13: Information affects the level of discrimination among right-wing female
candidates
Share of votes in the first round (1) (2) (3) (4)
Woman First -4.962 -5.737 -5.813 -5.127
(2.430)** (1.975)*** (2.029)*** (1.811)***
Any Info. Ballot -0.064 -2.435 -2.580 -2.846
(2.068) (1.782) (1.899) (1.733)
Woman First*Any Info. Ballot 5.292 7.521 7.584 6.710
(2.931)* (2.649)*** (2.704)*** (2.545)***
R2 0.18 0.42 0.42 0.54
N 165 165 165 165
Indiv. Controls N Y Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics N N N Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
OLS Regressions. Each column considers the restricted sample of right-wing pairs of candidates for which
we could observe the ballot. The outcome variable is the share of votes received by the pair of candidates
in the first round of the election. Column (1) controls only for the number of candidates in the precinct.
Column (2) also controls for the age, socioprofessional categories and political experience of male and
female candidates. Column (3) controls for the same variables but interacts the age of man and woman, the
socioprofessional categories of man and woman, and the political experience of man and woman. Column
(4) adds to these controls the unemployment rate, the average age of the population, the share of individuals
with a graduate degree and the share of voters living in rural areas within the precincts. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
lower than the quality of male candidates and the voters vote based the quality of the presumed
"main" candidate, then the observed result might only reflect this underlying difference of qual-
ity between male and female candidates.
While we do not observe the quality of the candidates, we do observe a proxy of it: the political
experience of the candidate. In Table 14, we interact the treatment with the incumbency status
of the candidates and show that discrimination is not responsive to it. In panels (A) and (B),
we show that the treatment effect does not vary with respect to past political experience of
either the female (Panel (A)) or the male candidate (Panel (B)), whatever the stringency of the
set of included controls: in all cases, the interaction term is not statistically significant. Thus,
differences of experience between male and female candidates do not drive directly the effect
we detect.
5.3 Where Did the Missing Votes Go ?
Right-wing pairs of candidates received less votes when the female candidate was listed first
on the ballot. A key question is therefore to understand where these lost votes went. A first
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Table 14: Absence of treatment heterogeneity with respect to male and female charac-
teristics on the right-wing ballots
(A) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Woman First -2.073 -1.528 -1.395 -1.161
(0.858)** (0.805)* (0.804)* (0.762)
Previously Elected (W) 5.334 4.175 4.107 3.716
(0.752)*** (0.744)*** (0.748)*** (0.707)***
Woman First*Previously Elected (W) 0.243 -0.098 -0.309 -0.368
(1.075) (1.019) (1.017) (0.966)
R2 0.33 0.40 0.43 0.48
N 1,391 1,389 1,389 1,389
Indiv. Controls N Y Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics N N N Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(B) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Woman First -2.435 -2.083 -1.941 -1.835
(1.135)** (1.091)* (1.138)* (1.063)*
Previously Elected (M) 6.506 4.700 5.036 4.774
(0.917)*** (0.905)*** (0.928)*** (0.877)***
Woman First*Previously Elected (M) 1.046 0.627 0.451 0.569
(1.275) (1.227) (1.270) (1.199)
R2 0.34 0.40 0.43 0.48
N 1,391 1,389 1,389 1,389
Indiv. Controls N Y Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics N N N Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
OLS Regressions. Each column considers the restricted sample of right-wing pairs. The outcome variable is the
share of votes received by the pair of candidates in the first round of the election. Column (1) controls only for
the number of candidates in the precinct. Column (2) also controls for the age, socioprofessional categories and
political experience of male and female candidates. Column (3) controls for the same variables but interacts the
age of man and woman, the socioprofessional categories of man and woman, and the political experience of man
and woman. Column (4) adds to these controls the unemployment rate, the average age of the population, the
share of individuals with a graduate degree and the share of voters living in rural areas within the precincts. Panel
(A) interacts the treatment with the political experience of the female candidate. Panel (B) interacts the treatment
with the political experience of the male candidate. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 15: Abstention, Blank and Null votes do not depend on the
treatment status of the right-wing candidate
(A) - Abstention Rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Right-Wing Woman First 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
R2 0.10 0.15 0.21 0.63
N 1,391 1,389 1,389 1,389
Indiv. Controls N Y Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics N N N Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(B) - Blank and Null Votes (1) (2) (3) (4)
Right-Wing Woman First -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.41 0.45 0.47 0.55
N 1,391 1,389 1,389 1,389
Indiv. Controls N Y Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics N N N Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
OLS Regressions. Each column considers the restricted sample of precincts with only
one right-wing candidate. In Panel (A), the outcome variable is the abstention rate in
the precinct. In Panel (B), the outcome variable is the share of blank and null votes in
the precinct. Column (1) controls only for the number of candidates in the precinct.
Column (2) also controls for the age, socioprofessional categories and political experi-
ence of male and female candidates among the right-wing pair. Column (3) controls
for the same variables but interacts the age of man and woman, the socioprofessional
categories of man and woman, and the political experience of man and woman within
the right-wing pair. Column (4) adds to these controls the unemployment rate, the
average age of the population, the share of individuals with a graduate degree and
the share of voters living in rural areas within the precincts. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
hypothesis is that discriminatory voters did not show up on the day of election, leading to a
differential abstention. This hypothesis cannot be ruled out, since every voters receive the ballots
and electoral programs of all candidates at home. A second hypothesis is that voters who might
have voted for the right-wing pair, were the male candidate first, ended up casting no ballot at
all or invalid ones: in this case, we would expect an increase in blank and invalid ballots. Finally,
discriminatory voters might instead have cast their ballot for another pair of candidates: in this
case, we would expect an increase in the share of votes of the other candidates.
We test these hypotheses in Tables 15 and 16, focusing on constituencies where only one right-
wing candidate ran, and on the treatment status of this candidate. Here again, we present results
for different types of specification. The results in Table 15 suggest that there exists no differential
abstention between the precincts where the female right-wing candidate was listed first and
those where she was listed second. This result confirms that the decisions leading to a lower
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share of votes for female-led right-wing candidates were unlikely to be made before the election
day. Similarly, we do not find a higher share of blank or null votes in these constituencies. In
both cases, this absence of effect holds whatever the specification.
In Table 16, we check whether the opponents of the right-wing candidate in these precincts
received a higher share of votes in the first round when the right-wing female candidate was
listed first on the ballot. In Panel (A), we regress the score of each competing pair of candidates
on the treatment status of the right-wing pair. Overall, we find that when the right-wing female
candidate was listed first on the ballot, the competing pairs had on average between 0.33 and
0.51 points higher shares of votes. This effect is significant at least at the 10% level across all the
specifications. In Panel (B), we propose an indirect test of absence of taste-based discrimination.
Namely, for all competing pairs of candidate, we check whether the additional vote shares they
received when the right-wing woman was listed first differed with their own treatment status -
i.e. with the position of the female candidate on their own ballot. Our results suggest that while
opponents received more votes when they faced a right-wing pair with a female candidate listed
first, this advantage did not depend on the position of the woman on their own ballot. This result
therefore leads us to argue that the discrimination we identify is unlikely to be taste-based: had
it been so, we would have expected opponents to receive less votes if their own female candidate
was listed first. In other terms, we would have expected a negative and significant interaction
term in the regressions of Panel (B).
5.4 Variation across precinct characteristics
In this section, we test whether discrimination varies with local characteristics of the precinct.
Namely, we test whether the treatment effect that we find varies with respect to the level of
education of the population (measured through the share of people above 15 holding a graduate
degree), the unemployment rate among the population aged between 15 and 64, and the average
age of the population. Finally, we relate our observed treatment effect to discrimination against
women on the labor market. To do so, we build on data released by Chamkhi (2015), reporting
unexplained wage gaps between men and women in 321 French employment zones in 2010.
These unexplained wage gaps are computed from a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, controlling
for a wide range of explanatory factors. We then interact this measure of discrimination with
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Table 16: Votes for political opponents of the right-wing pairs
(A) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Right-Wing Woman First 0.508 0.360 0.402 0.334
(0.196)*** (0.187)* (0.189)** (0.186)*
R2 0.44 0.57 0.58 0.58
N 4,333 4,321 4,321 4,321
Indiv. Controls N Y Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics N N N Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
(B) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Right-Wing Woman First 0.383 0.264 0.305 0.221
(0.327) (0.293) (0.294) (0.292)
Woman First 0.147 0.091 0.080 0.049
(0.362) (0.313) (0.314) (0.313)
Right-Wing Woman First*Woman First 0.255 0.190 0.193 0.225
(0.521) (0.452) (0.455) (0.454)
R2 0.44 0.57 0.58 0.58
N 4,333 4,321 4,321 4,321
Indiv. Controls N Y Inter. Inter.
Precinct characteristics N N N Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y
OLS Regressions. Each column considers the opponents of the right-wing pair within the restricted sample
of precincts including only one right-wing pair. The outcome variable is the share of votes received by the
considered competing pair in the first round of the election. Panel (A) reports the effect, for a political opponent
of the right-wing pair, of having a female listed first on the right-wing ballot. Panel (B), interacts this effect
with the treatment status of the considered political opponents. Column (1) controls only for the number of
candidates in the precinct and the party of the considered competing pair. Column (2) also controls for the
age, socioprofessional categories and political experience of male and female candidates within the considered
pair. Column (3) controls for the same variables but interacts the age of man and woman, the socioprofessional
categories of man and woman, and the political experience of man and woman. Column (4) adds to these
controls the unemployment rate, the average age of the population, the share of individuals with a graduate
degree and the share of voters living in rural areas within the precincts level in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 17: Heterogeneity with respect to local characteristics
Share of votes in the first round (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Woman First -0.788 -0.690 -1.350 0.022 -0.636 -1.565 -0.902 -0.192
(0.938) (5.839) (1.309) (2.574) (0.942) (5.771) (1.261) (2.522)
Unemployment Rate -38.170 -40.522
(4.618)*** (4.734)***
Woman First*Unemployment Rate -4.374 -5.134
(6.293) (6.301)
Mean Age 0.278 0.345
(0.084)*** (0.085)***
Woman First*Mean Age -0.013 0.008
(0.120) (0.119)
Share Graduate 3.769 2.082
(3.522) (3.560)
Woman First*Share Graduate -0.019 -1.269
(4.888) (4.753)
Unexplained Wage Gap -0.422 -0.393
(0.185)** (0.182)**
Woman First*Unexplained Wage Gap 0.153 0.109
(0.271) (0.267)
R2 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
N 25,964 25,966 25,966 25,966 25,964 25,964 25,964 25,964
Indiv. Controls Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Municipality characteristics N N N N Y Y Y Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
OLS Regressions at the municipality level. Each column considers the restricted sample of right-wing pairs of candidates for which we could observe the ballot. The
outcome variable is the share of votes received by the pair of candidates in the first round of the election. Columns (1) to (4) control for the number of candidates in the
precinct, the interacted age of the man and woman, the interacted socioprofessional categories of the man and woman, and the interacted political experience of the man
and woman. Columns (5) to (8) adds to these controls the unemployment rate, the average age of the population, the share of individuals with a graduate degree within
the municipality and a dummy variable indicating whether this municipality is located in a rural area. Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
the treatment variable. In this section, we use municipality-level data for two reasons. First,
the characteristics of local population and the vote shares are available at the municipality level.
Secondly, because the precincts and the employment zones overlap, it is preferable to study the
relationship between the electoral and job-market discrimination at the municipality level10.
We present the results of these interactions in Tables 17, 18 and 19. In Table 17, we interact
the treatment variable directly with the different local characteristics of interest. For sake of
brevity, we present only the results for the two most stringent specifications. For all the variables
considered, we detect no interaction effect. However, one might worry that this absence of result
comes from non-linear interactions. Therefore, in Tables 18 and 19, we present interactions with
respect to the top and bottom deciles of each of the considered local characteristic variable.
Overall, we find no interaction effect with the top and bottom deciles of age, education and
unemployment. However, we do find that discrimination is greater in areas belonging to the top
decile of unexplained wage gap on the labor market. In particular, we find that in these areas, the
discriminatory effect is greater by 2.7 to 3.2 percentage points, depending on the specification.
10Note that all the previous results also hold at the municipality level.
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Table 18: Heterogeneity with respect to local characteristics
Share of votes in the first round (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Woman First -1.244 -1.278 -1.371 -1.008 -1.155 -1.187 -1.163 -0.870
(0.595)** (0.576)** (0.618)** (0.624) (0.595)* (0.559)** (0.599)* (0.607)
Top Decile Unemployment -3.329 -3.307
(0.588)*** (0.597)***
Woman First*Top Decile Unemployment -0.546 -0.651
(0.770) (0.772)
Top Decile Mean Age 2.476 2.734
(0.810)*** (0.805)***
Woman First*Top Decile Unemployment -0.606 -0.282
(1.145) (1.141)
Top Decile Share Graduate 1.288 1.086
(0.612)** (0.614)*
Woman First*Top Decile Share Graduate 0.135 -0.050
(0.890) (0.875)
Top Decile Unexplained Wage Gap 2.937 2.768
(1.178)** (1.162)**
Woman First*Top Decile Unexplained Wage Gap -3.237 -2.736
(1.521)** (1.495)*
R2 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31
N 25,966 25,966 25,966 25,966 25,966 25,964 25,964 25,964
Indiv. Controls Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Municipality characteristics N N N N Y Y Y Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
OLS Regressions at the municipality level. Each column considers the restricted sample of right-wing pairs of candidates for which we could observe the ballot. The outcome variable is
the share of votes received by the pair of candidates in the first round of the election. Columns (1) to (4) control for the number of candidates in the precinct, the interacted age of the man
and woman, the interacted socioprofessional categories of the man and woman, and the interacted political experience of the man and woman. Columns (5) to (8) adds to these controls the
unemployment rate, the average age of the population, the share of individuals with a graduate degree within the municipality and a dummy variable indicating whether this municipality
is located in a rural area. Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 19: Heterogeneity with respect to local characteristics
Share of votes in the first round (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Woman First -1.411 -1.321 -1.401 -1.477 -1.340 -1.185 -1.233 -1.305
(0.569)** (0.606)** (0.581)** (0.630)** (0.571)** (0.591)** (0.566)** (0.614)**
Bottom Decile Unemployment 3.670 3.349
(0.568)*** (0.557)***
Woman First*Bottom Decile Unemployment 0.638 0.645
(0.860) (0.867)
Bottom Decile Mean Age -0.567 -0.727
(0.581) (0.573)
Woman First*Bottom Decile Mean Age -0.461 -0.634
(0.825) (0.813)
Bottom Decile Share Graduate 0.717 1.011
(0.744) (0.717)
Woman First*Bottom Decile Share Graduate 0.247 0.427
(0.969) (0.926)
Bottom Decile Unexplained Wage Gap -0.876 -0.816
(0.931) (0.909)
Woman First*Bottom Decile Unexplained Wage Gap 0.853 1.098
(1.595) (1.551)
R2 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31
N 25,966 25,966 25,966 25,966 25,966 25,964 25,964 25,964
Indiv. Controls Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter. Inter.
Municipality characteristics N N N N Y Y Y Y
Number of candidates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
OLS Regressions at the municipality level. Each column considers the restricted sample of right-wing pairs of candidates for which we could observe the ballot. The outcome variable is the share
of votes received by the pair of candidates in the first round of the election. Columns (1) to (4) control for the number of candidates in the precinct, the interacted age of the man and woman,
the interacted socioprofessional categories of the man and woman, and the interacted political experience of the man and woman. Columns (5) to (8) adds to these controls the unemployment
rate, the average age of the population, the share of individuals with a graduate degree within the municipality and a dummy variable indicating whether this municipality is located in a rural
area. Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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These results call for two comments. First the absence of interaction with the characteristics of
the population in the precinct might reflect an aggregation effect, coming from the fact that dif-
ferent types of population might be subject to limited attention and discriminatory behaviors11.
Secondly, the fact that gender discrimination in politics and on the labor market are linked sug-
gests that policies aiming at reducing discrimination should tackle those different aspects simul-
taneously.
6 Conclusion
Among the numerous reasons which might explain why women are under-represented in poli-
tics, gender-bias of voters is frequently considered as a potential candidate. While several pieces
of research argue that gender-biases are unlikely to play a role, isolating such effects using actual
electoral data can prove complicated, due to the presence of selection effects.
In this paper, we isolate gender-biases from selection effects using a natural experiment in
France. Using the fact that the candidates of the Départementales elections of 2015 had to run
for the first time by gender-balanced pairs, and considering that the order of the candidates on
the ballot is determined by alphabetical order, we show that the gender of the first candidate
on the ballot is as good-as-random. This framework therefore allows us to disentangle cleanly
selection effects and gender-biases, since we compare pairs of candidates which are on average
similar, but which differ only in the order of male and female candidates on the ballot.
We detect a sizable gender-bias affecting right-wing female candidates, due to voters who ar-
guably were simultaneously subject to limited attention concerning the rules of the election and
to discriminatory behaviors. Overall, the right-wing pairs where the female candidate was listed
first on the ballot saw their score in the first round decrease by about 1.5 percentage points, and
their probability of going to the second round or of winning the election in the first round de-
creasing by 4 percentage points. Furthermore, we provide evidence that this discrimination is
rather statistical than taste-based.
11In fact, identifying the respective roles of these two effects among different categories of population cannot be
done with aggregate administrative data, and calls for field or laboratory experiments which we reserve for future
research.
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Such results call for several important comments. First and foremost, while we find evidence of
gender-biases against right-wing candidates, the absence of evidence concerning the candidates
of other parties does not necessarily imply that they are not also affected by gender biases.
Indeed, not detecting evidence of discrimination for other parties can be either explained by
the fact that the voters are less subject to limited attention or by the fact that they discriminate
less.
Secondly, since limited attention seems to be at the heart of our result, it is crucial to under-
stand what are its determinants. Indeed, as acknowledged by DellaVigna (2009), understanding
limited attention requires to know the cost of acquiring relevant information about the decision
which is made - in our case, about the electoral rule. While our setting prevents us from investi-
gating this matter further, such findings raise important questions about how the electoral rules
and the governmental action are perceived by the citizens.
Thirdly, since the information available on the ballot on the day of election seems to affect both
the overall electoral performances of the candidates and the discrimination that women face, a
broader consideration should be paid about to the design of electoral ballots.
Finally, since we find greater electoral discrimination in places where discrimination against
women on the labor market is higher, gender discrimination among voters in politics is unlikely
to be reduced without other coordinated policies.
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7 Annex
7.1 Distribution of vote shares in each subsample, across first letter of surnames
Figure 3: Distribution of vote shares in the first round across first letter of candidates’ surname
(Restricted samples, Extreme-Left and Left)
(a) Extreme Left, First letter of the man’s surname (b) Extreme Left, First letter of the woman’s surname
(c) Left, First letter of the man’s surname (d) Left, First letter of the man’s surname
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Figure 4: Distribution of vote shares in the first round across first letter of candidates’ surname
(Restricted samples, Right and Extreme-Right)
(a) Right, First letter of the man’s surname (b) Right, First letter of the woman’s surname
(c) Extreme Right, First letter of the man’s surname
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